DOES THE PRIMARY SYSTEM CHOOSE THE BEST CANDIDATES?

Who is the best (that is, the strongest) candidate for either major party to nominate? That’s easy. It’s the candidate who will appeal most successfully to the party’s unswerving supporters, to those voters who are often – but not necessarily – inclined to support that party, to independent voters who boast of voting for the person not the party, and to new voters. That candidate is not necessarily the single most popular potential candidate of the party, but one who is, if not a first choice, an acceptable choice for the largest number of prospective voters. To put it briefly – but watch out for the double negative – the best candidate is the party’s least unacceptable candidate.

In 1972, the first year in which the modern primary-caucus system of presidential nomination was decisive, Senator George McGovern won the Democratic nomination because he had won more delegates than any other candidate. In fact, former Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who narrowly lost the 1968 election to Richard Nixon, received slightly more primary votes than McGovern (68,000 more out of a total primary vote of 16 million), but had the support of fewer elected delegates. Each received marginally more than one-quarter of the primary votes.

The rational question the Democratic Party should have asked was which potential candidate would be most likely to maximize the party’s support in the election? It is not a reflection on McGovern’s integrity, intelligence or experience to observe that, in the light of his being perceived as a very liberal, lesser known and uncharismatic Senator, he was not that candidate. As McGovern himself observed after his defeat, the worst any Democratic presidential candidate has ever suffered, “I wanted to run for president in the worst possible way – and I did.” Based on Humphrey’s strong run four years earlier under adverse circumstances (the chaos at the 1968 Democratic convention was evidence of a bitterly divided party), he was likely to be a much more popular candidate.

It might have been worse. Until the attempted assassination of Alabama Governor George Wallace on May 15, which resulted in crippling him and removing him from the race, he had decisively won the southern states of Florida, Tennessee and North Carolina, finishing second to McGovern in Wisconsin and second to Humphrey in Pennsylvania, Indiana and West Virginia. The day after the shooting, Wallace won the Michigan and Maryland primaries. At that point, Wallace was well ahead of his rivals. Despite his incapacity, he continued to poll at least twenty percent of the primary vote in three of the four remaining primaries. It is not difficult to imagine, had Wallace not been shot, that he would have had a significant plurality of both votes cast and delegates elected when the Democrats convened their convention. He would then have been the single most popular candidate, but it is unarguable that he, who had been elected Governor on the slogan “Segregation Now, Segregation Tomorrow, and Segregation Forever,” could not be nominated, unless the Democrats were willing to commit political suicide.

In 1976, Gerald Ford, who had succeeded to the presidency upon the resignation of Richard Nixon, won the Republican nomination with 53 percent of the primary vote, compared with California Governor Ronald Reagan’s 46 percent. Incumbency was decisive in Ford’s winning the nomination, but his unconditional pardon of Nixon was probably decisive in his losing the election. Jimmy Carter, originally a little-known candidate, won 39 percent of the Democratic primary vote in a field without strong opponents and failed to win a primary majority outside of the south and near-south until the last primary day in June. Under the circumstances, Reagan, a less unacceptable candidate than Ford, would have been a likely winner if he had been nominated.

In 1980, liberal Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy sought to take the nomination away from President Carter. It soon became apparent that the tragedy at Chappaquiddick was as fatal to his chances as Carter’s reputation as a weak president was fatal to his. It is very likely that Reagan would have defeated any Democrat, but it is almost certain that a number of leading Democrats would have fared better than Carter.

It isn’t only losing candidates who demonstrate the failure to choose the best candidate. In 1991, thanks to the ease with which the United States won the Gulf war, President George H.W. Bush’s popularity reached a record high. He looked unbeatable in 1992. One by one, the leading Democrats declined to compete for their party’s nomination. These included Governors Bruce Babbitt of Arizona and Mario Cuomo of New York, Senators Al Gove, Sam Nunn and Paul Simon, Representative Richard Gephardt, and the Reverend Jesse Jackson. All had national reputations and figured in speculation regarding their party’s nomination. When they bowed out, the field contained five candidates who may be fairly characterized as the B team: a little-known radical populist Senator (Tom Harkin); an anti-charismatic moderate Senator without a power base (Bob Kerrey); a former Senator who had been ill, looked ill and was still ill, although he lied about his medical condition, and who prescribed unpopular glum remedies for what ailed the United States (Paul Tsongas); a former California Governor widely caricatured as Governor Moonbeam (Jerry Brown), and the long-time and long-running Governor of a poor and small state who, alone among the candidates, had spent the time and money to organize a campaign for the long haul (Bill Clinton).

When Clinton was battered by charges of draft-dodging and marital infidelity on the eve of the first primary in New Hampshire, and later performed poorly in the early non-Southern primaries, none of his rivals had either the financial resources or popular support to capture the lead, and it was too late for a stronger candidate to enter the race. It is futile to speculate as to which of the party leaders who had earlier declined to run would have been the strongest candidate, but several would almost certainly have been stronger.

Now, more than a year before the presidential election of 2008, public opinion polls reveal that the front-runners for their party’s nomination are Democrat Hillary Clinton and Republican Rudolph Giuliani. Yet, among the leading candidates of both parties, it is likely that Clinton and Giuliani will confront the most opposition and skepticism among party regulars and others inclined to vote for that party.

Clinton’s unfavorable rating in the electorate is approximately equal to her favorable rating. This is due to her critical role in sidetracking universal single payer health insurance in 1993-94, principled antipathy to having a husband and wife both serve as President (as much as opposition to a father and son, but that was not the choice of the Democrats), the negative reaction of many likely Democratic voters to Clinton’s personality, and the largely unexpressed reluctance of many voters to elect a woman. A very large number of voters have a similar unexpressed reluctance to support an African-American candidate. The primary difference is that a large proportion of voters who are reluctant to support a woman are inclined to support a Democrat, while a much smaller proportion of voters who are reluctant to support a black candidate are likely to support a Democrat. If Clinton is nominated, loyal Democrats are likely to suppress their doubts and vote for her, but critical independents are less certain to do so.

Republican partisans will exploit the potential weaknesses of their rivals, including Romney’s Mormonism and McCain’s departures from party orthodoxy on campaign reform and immigration. However, Giuliani’s vulnerabilities are likely to prove to be more critical, including liberal positions on abortion and gay marriage, his three marriages and informing his second wife in a press conference of his intent to divorce her, his alienation from his children, and increasing criticism of his public conduct after 9/11, the very event which made him a major national political figure. At least until he becomes an announced candidate, Fred Thompson may be the least unacceptable Republican. Of course, if Clinton and Giuliani are both nominated, they won’t both lose, any more than both Nixon and McGovern could lose in 1972. But many voters will confront an unhappy choice.

The flaw revealed in this, the tenth election in which the presidential candidates will have been chosen by the primary-caucus system, is that the unrepresentative voters who participate in the process choose the one candidate they most favor (and who may win the nomination with only a small plurality of the primary vote), and not the candidate who has the widest support within the party, let alone in the general electorate. It isn’t the only flaw of the primary system, but it significant enough to undermine any pretense that the process reflects the public’s will.